Message A, sent by the initiator, does not benefit from sender authentication and does not provide message integrity. It could have been sent by any party, including an active attacker. Message contents do not benefit from message secrecy even against a purely passive attacker and any forward secrecy is out of the question. 0,0
Message B, sent by the responder, benefits from sender and receiver authentication and is resistant to Key Compromise Impersonation. Assuming the corresponding private keys are secure, this authentication cannot be forged. Message contents benefit from message secrecy and weak forward secrecy under a passive attacker: if the responder's long-term static keys were previously compromised, the later compromise of the initiator's long-term static keys can lead to message contents being decrypted by an attacker. 4,3
Message C, sent by the initiator, benefits from sender and receiver authentication and is resistant to Key Compromise Impersonation. Assuming the corresponding private keys are secure, this authentication cannot be forged. Message contents benefit from message secrecy and weak forward secrecy under a passive attacker: if the initiator's long-term static keys were previously compromised, the later compromise of the responder's long-term static keys can lead to message contents being decrypted by an attacker. 4,3
Message D, sent by the responder, benefits from sender and receiver authentication and is resistant to Key Compromise Impersonation. Assuming the corresponding private keys are secure, this authentication cannot be forged. Message contents benefit from message secrecy and weak forward secrecy under a passive attacker: if the responder's long-term static keys were previously compromised, the later compromise of the initiator's long-term static keys can lead to message contents being decrypted by an attacker. 4,3
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